Two recent phenomena have transformed the nature of world trade: the explosive growth of Chinese trade, and the growth of vertically specialized trade due to international production fragmentation. While vertical specialization may explain much of the growth and unique features of Chinese trade, few papers have quantitatively assessed these two phenomena together. In part, this is because it is difficult to measure just how vertically specialized Chinese trade is. The unique features of China's extensive processing trade cause both the identification of imported intermediate goods, and their allocation across sectors, to depend upon the Chinese trade regime. In this paper, we estimate the vertical specialization of Chinese exports, addressing these two challenges. Using two Chinese benchmark input-output tables, and a detailed Chinese trade dataset which distinguishes processing trade from other forms of trade, we develop a new method of identifying intermediate goods imported into China. Vertical specialization is then estimated using two methods. The first method uses the Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) measure, the official benchmark IO tables, and incorporates our identification correction. The second method follows the first, but also incorporates the Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008) method of splitting the benchmark IO tables into separate tables for processing and normal exports, in order to address the allocation problem. Results show strong evidence of an Asian network of intermediate suppliers to China, and the two methods provide a range of estimates for the foreign content of Chinese exports. For 2002, we find the vertical specialization of China's aggregate exports ranged between 25% and 46%, with some individual sectors as high as 52%-95%. Across destinations, under both methods, vertical specialization declined with the income level of the trading partner.
Introduction
In recent years, two interrelated important phenomena have occurred that transform the nature of global trade. The first phenomenon is the international fragmentation of production.
Production processes are sliced thinner and thinner into many stages, and the resulting production fragments are carried out in many countries, each specializing in different stages of the vertical production chain. The second phenomenon is the explosive growth of Chinese trade, and China's increasing importance in these global production chains. In current dollars, the value of China's exports plus imports rose from $280.9 billion in 1995 to $1760.4 billion in 2006--a growth of about 527%. In that year, 42 percent of China's imports and 53 percent of China's exports were processing trade--imports of intermediate goods which are further processed or finished, and are made solely for export. This trade is concentrated in fragments within relatively high-tech products, and is carried out largely by foreign-invested enterprises.
China's prominence in trade has raised numerous questions. How is it that China's trade can grow so rapidly? Has China's comparative advantage really shifted to production of hightech goods? How does this rapid growth and new composition of trade affect China's gains from trade? Increasingly, it appears that the answers to these questions may be found by studying the impact of international production fragmentation on China's trade. Because the splitting of the production process leads to products crossing borders many more times than in ordinary trade, production fragmentation across borders could account for rapid growth in trade (Yi, 2003) . While China's final good exports may appear far more high-tech than traditional comparative advantage would predict (Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2006) , fragmentation theory suggests that the fragments which make up the production chain are likely to be allocated across countries in a way that reflects traditional comparative advantage (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001) . Finally, the global gains from trade may be enlarged because international production fragmentation allows more finely defined production processes to be allocated across countries more efficiently (Yi, 2003) .
1 Unlike intra-industry trade, this "intra-product" trade might particularly foster the growth of trade between industrial and developing countries (Jones, et al., 2005) .
But to what extent has China's trade been influenced by international production fragmentation? Recent literature studying the pattern and growth of Chinese trade has focused on foreign direct investment, trade liberalization, WTO accession, and government incentives, with little discussion of fragmentation. 2 Similarly the literature on fragmentation has largely focused on developing and testing various theories of the firm's decision to fragment production across borders, with little application to China. 3 A few studies have attempted to measure the importance of trade in parts and components in global, East Asian, and Chinese trade (Yeats, 2001; Ng and Yeats 2001, 2003; Athukorala, 2006; Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006) , or document the growing importance of China in East Asian trade in parts and components (Baldwin, 2006; Athukorala, 2006) . But little work has been done exploring the degree to which China's trade has become vertically specialized due to production fragmentation. One exception is Ping (2005) , who uses the Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) 1 An individual country's gains from trade might also be enlarged if fragmentation lowers adjustment costs to trade liberalization, by allowing displaced workers to find new employment in a different stage of production within the same sector (Deardorff, 2001; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001 ). Deardorff (2005) argues that in a world of fragmentation, the gains from trade result will likely hold. However, it is unclear if all factors of production will benefit from fragmentation. See also Markusen (2005) .
2
Some recent examples include Bhattasali, et al. (2004) , Dean, Lovely and Wang (2008) , Wang (2003) , Schott (2006) , Rodrik (2006) , Hammer (2006) , Amiti and Javorcik (2008) . One exception is Dean and Lovely (2008) , who investigate the impact of fragmentation and trade growth on China's environment. See the survey by Spencer (2005) . An exception is Feenstra and Hanson (2005) , who test different versions of property rights and incomplete contract theories using detailed Chinese trade data. 4 Both approaches identify Hong Kong, the US, and Singapore as being the most vertically specialized among China's export destinations, with foreign content ranging from 27%-29%
(Non-Split) to 50%-59% (Split). However, China's exports to transition and developing economies (e.g., India) are far less vertically specialized. These results suggest very different trading patterns: more traditional exports to developing country partners, and more nontraditional, fragmented exports to richer trading partners.
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This concept was first developed in an earlier version of this paper (Dean, Fung and Wang (2007 Singapore or Malaysia that were initially designed in Japan. These components might then be assembled and packaged using Chinese labor and capital, and then exported to Japan, the EU, the US and other countries.
HIY used input-output tables to calculate VS share as:
where u is a 1 x n vector of 1's, A M is an n x n imported coefficients matrix, I is the identity matrix, A D is the n x n domestic coefficient matrix, X is the n x 1 export vector and x k is a scalar that denotes the amount of exports from country k. The numerator of equation (1) measures all the imported inputs, iterated over the economy's production structure, that are needed to produce the exports of a country from all n sectors. Dividing this by the value of total exports yields the total (both direct and indirect) share of a country's exports attributable to imported inputs (VS share). (2004)) is 6 There are at least two concepts used in the literature which are related to VS share. One is the domestic content share, which is the gross value of exports minus the value of all imported intermediate goods used in their production divided by export value. A second term used is "domestic value added share", which is not often used in the academic literature, but is identical in definition to the domestic content share. See Chen, Cheng, Fung and Lau (2004) and Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008) for proofs relating these concepts.
to assume that the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to total imports--which is unknown--is the same as the ratio of total intermediate inputs to total absorption--which can be computed from a country's I-O alone. These shares are plotted for the merchandise sectors in Figure 1 . These three methods yield significantly different estimates. Using the DFW approach, the median imported intermediate share is 96%, and the minimum is 57%. In contrast, the median share using the I-O approach is 82% and the minimum is 38%. As can be seen in Figure 1 , there is very little discernible relationship between the DFW and I-O distributions of imported intermediate shares.
As expected, the DFW approach yields shares that are greater than or equal to the BEC method.
Thus, a comparison of BEC shares with I-O shares shows a similar lack of discernible relationship.
We believe that the general DFW identification approach introduced here is conceptually and economically an improvement over the alternative methods of identifying intermediate imports. Fundamental economic principles teach us that economic agents do respond to incentives. When Chinese firms or foreign firms import intermediate goods into the country for processing, there is every incentive for these economic agents to declare that these inputs are used for processing. For sectors such as information technology, agreements like the ITA may have reduced these incentives. But it seems that there is relatively little cost for these processing firms to still declare them as such. Furthermore, even if they do not declare these imported inputs as 10 The Chinese input-output tables are of the competitive import type, which means that the tables do not differentiate between domestic intermediate goods and imported intermediate goods. To achieve the objective of our project, we need to convert the input-output tables into the non-competitive type, i.e. to separate out imported inputs and domestic inputs. As discussed earlier, the main method we used is the DFW approach. 11 These sectors are listed in Dean, et al. (2007) .. used for processing purposes, the BEC method should still be able to catch these outliers. At worst, it seems to us that the general DFW approach is no better than the BEC method. In 2002, the Asian network continued to account for 60% of China's supply of imported intermediates, but with a somewhat decreased reliance on Japan and the Tigers. While these large suppliers still accounted for half of China's total imported intermediates in 2002, the share supplied by other East and Southeast Asian countries rose to 10.3% (an increase of nearly 50%).
A closer look shows an increasing share of China's inputs coming from Taiwan and Southeast
Asia, but decreasing shares from Japan, the other Tigers and other East Asian countries.
12 Because of these incentives, it is possible that producers will report more imports as processing imports than is actually true, implying that China official customs statistics will overstate the amount of processing imports. This may be one of the reasons that only about 85 percent of processing imports were identified by UN BEC classification as intermediate inputs. Electronic elements and devices alone account for 18% of China's total imported intermediates, and nearly 30% of China's processing imported intermediates. The Asian network described above was the source of about 69% of these five intermediates, and 86% of electronic elements and devices alone. 
Measuring vertical specialization: Non-Split Method
Having met the identification challenge, the next step is to incorporate these newly identified imported inputs into the HIY measure of vertical specialization. Here we work with the original benchmark tables which do not distinguish processing from ordinary exports. To identify the coefficients in the A M matrix in equation (1), we use our new DFW estimates of total sectoral imported intermediates, and assume that these imported inputs are used in each industry in the same proportion as indicated in the original input-output One potential weakness with this approach is that typically input-output tables are constructed based mostly on information provided by firms located within the country. While there are a large number of foreign firms located in China, the large number of domestic firms using mainly domestically produced inputs may skew the I-O coefficients towards input-output relationships based mostly on domestically produced inputs. This could lead to an underestimation of VS share. Perhaps a more important weakness is that this procedure does not address the allocation challenge discussed earlier. It maintains the assumption that the relative proportions in which imported intermediates are used are the same, regardless of whether the product is sold locally, exported under ordinary trade, or exported under processing trade. As a result, the Non-Split estimates can only show an average VS share across all Chinese production.
To the extent that processing exports are actually more intensive in their use of imported inputs, the Non-Split results will be biased downwards.
The results for both direct VS shares and total VS shares for each year, using this NonSplit method of measurement are shown in Table 1 . The aggregate intermediate import content
(total VS share) of China's exports, incorporating the DFW identification method was 17.8 % in 1997, and 25.4 % in 2002. In general, the direct shares are about half of the total VS shares, but they show a similar increase during this period. While these results suggest that the fragmentation of China's exports to the world has risen significantly, it would be premature to conclude a steady rising trend over the period with only two years of observations. Non-Split estimates using the BEC or I-O identification methods were generally similar, though somewhat smaller than those incorporating DFW identification.
Across sectors, average VS share for 2002 merchandise exports was 18 %. Figure 3 shows a large number of sectors with above average VS share in that year. Of these, two sectors had total VS shares exceeding 50% of exports (cultural and office equipment (56.8 %) and electronic computers (51.5 %). An additional three sectors had foreign content ranging between 40% and 50% of the value of exports. In most cases, sectoral VS shares have also grown significantly. While imported inputs constituted 36.7 cents of every US dollar worth of electronic computer products exported by China in 1997, this grew to 56.8 cents by 2002. Total VS more than doubled in cultural and office equipment.
China appears to be increasingly enmeshed in the global network of production fragmentation, whether we consider its trade with the world or its trade with individual trading partners. Figure 4 shows the foreign content of China's merchandise exports to a number of trading partners for 1997 and 2002, using the Non-Split measure. China's exports to Singapore, Hong Kong, the US, Mexico, and the EU15 are the most vertically specialized, with foreign content ranging from 26.3 to 28.6%. VS shares for merchandise exports to Taiwan and Japan are just under 25%. To the extent that production fragmentation is more prevalent in high tech goods such as computers, we might expect the foreign content of China's exports to fall as the income level of the partner country falls. The Non-Split VS share estimates do show some evidence for this idea. VS shares are lower for Eastern European and Latin American countries than for the US, Europe, Japan, or the Asian Tigers. For India and Sub-Saharan Africa, the VS share estimates are a full third below that for the US and the EU15. As with the aggregate and sectoral results, the Non-Split estimates show an upward trend.
Measuring vertical specialization: Split Method
The second challenge we identified in calculating the vertical specialization of China's exports, was the allocation of imported intermediates across sectors. We know that the use of intermediates is actually inter-related with the trade regime. Processing imports are only used in processing exports (by definition). Thus, they are not used for goods sold locally or goods exported as ordinary exports. Processing exports are highly concentrated by sector. Thus, exports in these industries will likely use a much higher ratio of imported inputs than exports of other types of goods. Ideally, we would like to modify the HIY measure to capture these characteristics. This would require a split I-O 
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where D refers to domestic sales, N refers to normal exports, P refers to processing exports. As before, u is a 1x n vector of 1's, I is the identity matrix and x k is a scalar that denotes the total amount of exports from country k, which in our case is China. The n x 1 export vector is now split into X N and X P, which are normal exports and processing exports, respectively. The n x n domestic coefficient matrix A D is now subdivided into the domestic coefficient matrix associated with domestic sales A DD and the domestic coefficient matrix associated with processing exports A DP .
Equation (2) The KWW methodology involves several key assumptions: (1) that sectors use imported intermediates in the same proportion, for goods destined for normal exports or for domestic sales; (2) that processing exports can and will only be sold abroad and never domestically; (3) that processing exports are more intensive in the use of imported intermediates than normal exports or goods produced for domestic sales; (4) that all processing imports are used only for processed exports; (5) that the coefficients of use associated with domestically produced inputs are accurately measured as the residuals between the original input-output table and our A M matrix.; (6) that processing export production uses no domestic intermediate goods.
Data on direct payments to capital and labor (value-added) and on use of domestic intermediate 14 The method is to first guess a reasonable value of the needed coefficients, e.g. an initial vale of the imported intermediate good i used by sector j for processing exports. Then to get to the estimated "true" value, a computer program is created such that the square of the difference between the "true" value of the coefficient and the initial value is minimized, subject to all the resource flow constraints. These constraints include, for example, the fact that the value of processing exports in a sector is the sum of the domestically produced inputs, imported intermediate inputs as well as all the primary factors (such as land, labor and capital) used in the production of such processed exports. The program is run until the conjectured coefficients converge to the final estimated values. This approach is very similar to a standard approach of formalizing learning in some macroeconomics models as well as in some learning models used in the computer science literature. Results using the Split method (Table 1) show that the aggregate estimates of the foreign content of Chinese exports in 2002 was about 46 percent, nearly 21 percentage points more than the Non-Split estimate. This divergence in estimates is due in part to the divergence in VS shares between the processing exports and normal exports. At 74 %, the foreign content of processing exports was far higher than that of the normal exports (11%). This wide difference, coupled with the large share of exports classified under the processing regime in 2002, yields an overall weighted average foreign content which is significantly higher than the estimate based on the Non-Split method. Figure 5a shows both similarities and distinctions between the merchandise sectors identified by the two approaches as those with high vertical specialization. Both approaches identify electronic computers, cultural and office equipment, telecommunications equipment, computer peripheral equipment, electronic elements and devices, radio/TV/other communications equipment, and plastics as among China's ten most vertically specialized exports. Though magnitudes and ranks differ across approaches, the foreign content in these sectors ranges from 28%-57% (Non-Split) to 63%-95% (Split). Many of the sectors identified by the Non-Split method as above average VS share are also classified as above average using the Split method.
However, the Split approach yields a wider range of VS share estimates (4.3 % to 95.4 %), and again a higher average VS share (32%) than the Non-Split approach.
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a very strong positive correlation (0.89) between the shares of processing exports in these sectors and the Split estimates of foreign content. The expected but striking contrast between VS shares for processing and for normal exports in these sectors can be seen in figure 5b . What may be more interesting is the fact that the differences between the Split and Non-Split VS share estimates are also strongly positively correlated (0.79) with the ratio of processing exports to total sectoral exports. Chinese exports by destination. Both approaches identify Hong Kong, the US, and Singapore as being the most vertically specialized among China's export destinations, with foreign content ranging from 27%-29% (Non-Split) to 50%-59% (Split). In fact, of the top ten vertically specialized destinations ranked by the Non-Split method, eight are also ranked in the top ten by the alternative Split method. Once again Split estimates indicate a higher average and broader range of VS shares (18% -60%) than estimates based on the Non-Split method (18% -29%). The differences between the two estimates are highly correlated with processing share, and are negligible for destinations where processing exports account for less than a fifth of Chinese total merchandise exports. As with the Non-Split method, the Split method shows a strong positive correlation between VS share and income of the trading partner.
Comparing the two approaches in a given year, we find that differences in VS share estimates are strongly positively correlated with the share of processing exports, across sectors and destinations. Thus, the Non-Split and Split estimates might be viewed as lower and upper bound measures of vertical specialization, which converge as the share of processing exports decreases. In sectors where imported input intensities differ little for exports or domestic sales, we would expect the magnitudes of the two measures to be very similar. Despite the differences in magnitudes, the two measures yield similar rankings for VS share by sector and by destination.
Over time, however, the Non-Split and Split approaches tell opposite stories. As table 1 shows, in contrast to the Non-Split results, Split total VS share of Chinese exports falls over time.
Although the VS share for normal exports grows, it falls for processing exports, which account for a larger share of China's total exports. As KWW discuss in detail, this decline also appears in 
Conclusion
While production fragmentation and China's rapidly growing trade have been recognized as important economic phenomena, the importance of such fragmentation in China's trade growth has been left unexamined until recently. In part, this has been due to two key difficulties arising Comparing the two approaches in a given year, we find that differences in VS share estimates are strongly positively correlated with the share of processing exports, across sectors and destinations. To some extent this is anticipated, since the Non-Split estimates reflect the average share of vertical specialization across all Chinese production, and cannot capture the relatively higher imported input intensity of processing exports. Thus, we can view these two methods as yielding lower and upper bound estimates of VS share. Comparing the two approaches over time, we find the Non-Split and Split estimates disagree on the change in China's vertical specialization. These differences may illustrate the importance of addressing both the identification and the allocation challenges in measuring vertical specialization. They may also illustrate differences in the sensitivity of the Non-Split and Split measures to two trends: growing vertical specialization, as production technologies become more internationally fragmented, and declining vertical specialization as a country moves along a global supply chain and produces an increasingly sophisticated or a wider range of fragments. 
